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EARLY SCHOLARSHIP OFFERS  
AND THE NCAA 
Alfred C. Yen* 
Abstract: Over the last few years, many NCAA Division I universities have 
begun offering athletic scholarships to progressively younger student-
athletes. Both student-athletes and institutions have much to gain from 
early informal athletic scholarships. This Article argues, however, that the 
costs of these early scholarships outweigh the benefits for both student-
athletes and institutions. Although the NCAA has laudably begun the 
process of curbing informal scholarship deals with underclassmen, this 
Article argues that existing practices are unlikely to change unless the 
NCAA adopts regulatory strategies fundamentally different from simple 
prohibitions of the sort recently considered and rejected. Real reform will 
be difficult to achieve unless institutions bear real costs for pursuing un-
derclassmen and the value of early scholarship deals is diminished. This 
Article makes a proposal to accomplish real reform by actually allowing 
these early informal commitments. Although this may seem counterintui-
tive at first glance, the Article shows that this proposal will discourage in-
stitutions from making early scholarship offers and therefore constitutes 
real reform. Granted, no proposal is perfect. Nevertheless, the one made 
here hopefully will advance the dialog that takes place as the NCAA eval-
uates a new framework to deal with the difficulties of early recruitment. 
Introduction 
 Over the last few years, many NCAA Division I universities have 
begun offering athletic scholarships to progressively younger student-
athletes. Today, it is increasingly common for high school sophomores 
to receive such offers,1 and a few institutions have pursued and even 
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1 See, e.g., Brad Allis, Marana Sophomore Getting Pac-10 Offers, Wildcat Sports Rep., May 
10, 2010, http://tucsoncitizen.com/wildcatsportsreport/2010/05/10/marana-sophomore-
getting-pac-10-offers/ (describing how one sophomore “already has a host of scholarship 
offers including most of the Pac-10”); Pat Forde, It’s a Scary Thought, but Middle Schoolers Are 
Now Recruitable Players, ESPN ( July 11, 2007), http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/columns/ 
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received commitments from seventh and eighth graders.2 These young 
recruits are, of course, very highly regarded athletes with special talent 
to offer universities. Given the competitive pressures of college sports, it 
comes as no surprise that coaches rush to identify and recruit the most 
talented players. And from the student-athlete’s perspective, there is 
much to gain from taking a school’s offer. If a child has grown up 
dreaming of playing football for the University of Southern California 
or basketball for the University of Kentucky, why not accept the dream 
when a coach offers it?3 Indeed, if the recruit decides not to accept the 
offer right away, it may not be there when he or she is a senior. 
                                                                                                                      
 
story?columnist=forde_pat&id=2930720&sportCat=ncb (describing early scholarship of-
fers to eighth-grade basketball players and noting that ten rising sophomores had appar-
ently already committed to colleges); J.P. Giglio & Ken Tysiac, Tokoto Gets Lots of Attention, 
News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), June 18, 2010, http://www.newsobserver.com/2010/ 
06/18/538857/tokoto-gets-lots-of-attention.html (reporting an offer of a scholarship to a 
high school sophomore); How Does a College Coach Offer a Sophomore or Freshman During the 
Football Recruiting Process?, Recruiting-101.com ( June 17, 2009), http://recruiting-101. 
com/how-does-a-college-coach-offer-a-sophomore-or-freshman-during-the-football-recruiting- 
process/ (describing the existence of scholarship offers to high school freshmen and 
sophomores and describing how offers are made despite NCAA rules). 
2 See, e.g., Jeff Drummond, Avery Youngest Player to Commit to Cats, Rivals.com (May 1, 
2008), http://rivalshoops.rivals.com/content.asp?SID=910&CID=803673 (reporting the com-
mitment of eighth-grader Michael Avery to play basketball at the University of Kentucky); 
Jeff Eisenberg, How Early Is Too Early for a Coach to Offer a Scholarship?, Rivals.com (May 11, 
2010, 5:49 PM), http://rivals.yahoo.com/ncaa/basketball/blog/the_dagger/post/How-
early-is-too-early-for-a-coach-to-offer-a-sc?urn=ncaab,240334 (describing offers of college ath-
letic scholarships to eighth-grade girls); Gary Klein, Trojans Get Their First Commitment . . . 
for 2015, L.A. Times, Feb. 5, 2010, http://www.latimes.com/sports/college/usc/la-spw-usc-
football-sills5–2010feb05,0,456634.story (reporting that thirteen-year-old quarterback David 
Sills received and accepted a scholarship offer from the University of Southern Califor-
nia); 8th Grade Female Player Offered Scholarship to Michigan, Winning Hoops (May 11, 2010), 
http://www.winninghoops.com/pages/Breaking-News–8th–Grade-Female-Player-Offered-
Scholarship-To-Michigan.php (last visited Nov. 16, 2010) (reporting the University of 
Michigan’s offer to an eighth-grade female); USC Gets Commitment from 13-Year-Old QB, CBS 
Sports (Feb. 5, 2010), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/story/12888171/report- 
usc-gets-commitment-from-13yearold-qb (reporting on David Sills’s acceptance of an offer 
from the University of Southern California as a seventh-grader). 
3 See Sean Gregory, Courting Eighth-Graders, Time, Oct. 8, 2007, at 58 (describing early re-
cruitment and reporting on the statement of Tanesha Boatright, whose eighth grade son 
received a scholarship offer from the University of Southern California: “So many people are 
getting loans and are in great debt just to pay for college. To get a free ride, as a single moth-
er with four kids, that’s all you can ask for.”); Drummond, supra note 2. Howard Avery, father 
of eighth-grader Michael Avery, who received a scholarship offer from the University of Ken-
tucky, stated: 
It’s a dream school for any kid who grows up wanting to play basketball. There’s 
[sic] only a few of them out there: Kentucky, North Carolina, Duke, Indiana 
back east; UCLA out here. If you’ve got an opportunity to play for one of those 
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 These benefits may explain why universities and underclassmen 
make commitments to each other, but the deals also involve consider-
able risk to both sides.4 Sixteen-year-old high school sophomores will 
physically and mentally change before enrolling as eighteen-year-old 
college freshmen. They probably do not know much about the differ-
ences between schools. Even if students learn about the particulars of 
the university that offers them an athletic scholarship, their decision to 
accept involves considerable guesswork about the kind of college ex-
perience they will desire. Granted, recruits may care most about playing 
their chosen sport for a top college team, but even here there are no 
guarantees. If recruits do not develop to their full athletic potential, 
they may not play regularly, and the university will have prematurely 
squandered precious scholarship money on players who do not truly 
contribute to the school’s athletic program. 
 These risks indicate that universities and student-athletes alike 
would be better off if they waited until a recruit’s senior year to make 
commitments to each other. Universities would know more about the 
student’s athletic and academic ability, and students would have the 
benefit of greater maturity and knowledge about their interests. This 
seemingly common sense result does not occur, however, because uni-
versities consider athletic success serious business—both literally and 
figuratively. Michigan surely wants to beat Ohio State for bragging 
rights, but more importantly Michigan wants its football and basketball 
teams to win because those victories hold the key to lucrative post-season 
competition. A school whose teams participate in a major post-season 
football game and the NCAA basketball tournament can collect as much 
as $120 million in gross revenue.5 Such success would be highly unlikely 
                                                                                                                      
 
schools and get a great education, why not? We don’t need a hundred offers; we 
just need one great program and one great coach. 
Drummond, supra note 2. 
4 This Article uses the term “underclassmen” to refer to any student who has not yet 
reached his or her senior year of high school. 
5 See Josh Robins, How Much Revenue Did Your Favorite Football Bowl Subdivision School 
Take in in 2007–08? This Chart Will Tell You, Orlando Sentinel (July 28, 2009, 11:50 AM), 
http://blogs.orlandosentinel.com/sports_college/2009/07/how--much-revenue--did-your-
favorite-fbs-school-take-in-in-200708--this-chart-will-tell-you.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2011) 
(listing total revenues of major athletic programs as reported to the U.S. Department of 
Education’s Office of Postsecondary Education). In 2007–2008, the University of Texas 
reported over $120 million in gross athletic revenue. Id. Whether major football or basket-
ball programs actually turn a profit is subject to debate. A recent CNNMoney.com story 
noted that some basketball programs reported significant profits to the Department of 
Education (with the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill reporting over $12 mil-
lion) and other programs reported losses. Chris Isidore, Nothing but Net, Basketball Dollars by 
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unless a school enrolls a sufficient number of skilled athletes to compete 
on its behalf. Schools therefore pursue the most valued recruits briskly, 
hoping to identify them and lock them up before the competition gets 
there.6 This in turn pressures student-athletes to find and accept schol-
arship offers because they understand that opportunities will grow pro-
gressively scarce as more and more early commitments are made.7 
 Offers of athletic scholarships to underclassmen violate the NCAA’s 
core values. The NCAA Constitution clearly states, 
Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, 
and their participation should be motivated primarily by edu-
cation and by the physical, mental and social benefits to be 
derived. Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an 
avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from ex-
ploitation by professional and commercial enterprises.8 
Early recruitment—particularly early commitment—violates this provi-
sion because it elevates athletics over education. Few underclassmen 
are ready to choose a college, and many have not even taken the neces-
sary standardized testing that most colleges require. Nevertheless, insti-
tutions use scholarships to pressure recruits into rushing their college 
decisions.9 
                                                                                                                      
 
School, CNNMoney.com (Mar. 18, 2010), http://money.cnn.com/2010/03/18/news/com-
panies/basketball_profits/index.htm?postversion=2010031807. The accounting practices 
of universities are not uniform, however, particularly in how they attribute various indirect 
costs to athletic programs. This renders reported profit and loss figures highly unreliable. 
See Victor Matheson, NCAA Basketball Tournament Teams Don’t Generate Profits, Christian 
Sci. Monitor (Mar. 19, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/The-Sports-Economist/ 
2010/0319/NCAA-basketball-tournament-teams-don-t-generate-profits. 
6 See Andy Staples, The Trend of Players Choosing a College Before a High School, SI.com (May 
6, 2008), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2008/writers/andy_staples/05/06/kentucky.0506/ 
index.html (“Remember, coaches are the ultimate adopters. If one coach enjoys even a mod-
icum of success after locking down middle schoolers, other coaches will start offering kids 
who still watch Spongebob Squarepants after practice.”). 
7 NCAA Academic & Membership Affairs Staff, Division I Manual art. 15.5 (2010) 
[hereinafter Division I Manual] (establishing limits on scholarships available in NCAA 
Division I sports). 
8 Id. art. 2.9. 
9 See Bill Pennington, Recruits Clamor for More from Coaches with Less, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 
2008, at D1 (describing how one women’s lacrosse coach played recruits against each oth-
er to create such pressure). The coach explained: 
For example, if she is looking for a goalie, she might bring to campus each of 
her top three potential recruits at the position in the space of a few days. She 
said she would tell them that there were three players, that all three had been 
on campus recently and that they had a week to decide whether to attend 
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 To its credit, the NCAA recognizes the undesirability of early com-
mitment and has taken steps to discourage the practice and curb its 
worst effects. The NCAA Division I Manual contains numerous provi-
sions designed to prevent universities from asking prospective student-
athletes for commitments until their senior year,10 thereby relieving 
pressure to make premature decisions about college before academic 
and social preferences are fully formed. In particular, universities gener-
ally may not write or call prospective recruits until their junior year,11 
and student-athletes cannot formally accept scholarships until specific 
dates in their senior year, as prescribed by the National Letter of Intent 
program.12 
 This regulation of early scholarship offers is only partially success-
ful, at best. It does give recruits the ability to postpone binding deci-
sions about college until their senior year, but it does not effectively 
relieve the pressure associated with early scholarship commitments. 
The rules contain loopholes that allow institutions and recruits to make 
non-binding verbal commitments about scholarships.13 In theory, these 
early informal commitments are not as problematic as formally binding 
ones. Recruits who want to avoid the pressure of early recruiting should 
be able to ignore early offers because no one can make binding deci-
sions until the senior year.  
 In practice, however, a recruiting process that permits only early 
informal commitment is actually worse for recruits than one allowing 
early binding commitment. As an initial matter, early informal commit-
ments make early recruiting more attractive to institutions by removing 
the risks associated with the practice. If a school discovers that a recruit 
is not as good as initially thought or that a scholarship might be better 
used on someone else, the school can withdraw its commitment and 
                                                                                                                      
Delaware. The first player to commit gets the scholarship money. The others 
do not. 
Id. 
10 See, e.g., Division I Manual, supra note 7, arts. 13.1.1, 13.1.3.1, 13.4.1, 13.9.2 (limit-
ing the contact universities can have with recruits prior to the recruits’ senior year in high 
school). For a discussion of these rules individually, see infra notes 70–74 and accompany-
ing text. 
11 See id. arts. 13.1.3.1, 13.4.1. 
12 See About the National Letter of Intent (NLI), NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/ 
connect/nli/NLI/About+the+NLI/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2011). For a discussion of the NLI 
program, see infra notes 64–70 and accompanying text. 
13 See Klein, supra note 2 (describing how a coach asked an intermediary to give a re-
cruit the coach’s phone number so that he could extend an early scholarship offer); How 
Does a College Coach Offer a Sophomore or Freshman During the Football Recruiting Process?, supra 
note 1 (describing various ways coaches extend early scholarship offers to underclassmen). 
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avoid having to live with its “mistake.”14 Even worse, a recruit who un-
derstands the risk of withdrawn commitment finds him- or herself in a 
quandary. If he or she makes contingency plans by talking to other 
schools, the school to which he or she is verbally committed may ques-
tion his or her loyalty and recruit other players to take his or her 
place.15 Of course, if the recruit does nothing, he or she risks having no 
scholarship should his or her original school change its mind. In short, 
early informal commitments are actually worse for recruits than early 
formal commitments because early informal commitments force re-
cruits to experience the stress of making premature decisions about col-
lege without receiving any certainty that supposedly done deals will be 
onh ored.16 
 Because of these problems, the NCAA has begun to reconsider 
how it regulates early recruitment. In June 2010, the Division I Recruit-
ing and Athletics Personnel Issues Cabinet (“DI Cabinet”) proposed 
new legislation designed to slow down the pace of early recruiting and 
                                                                                                                      
14 See, e.g., Jeff Fedotin, High School Junior’s College Future Is Uncertain After Eighth-Grade Com-
mitment to Kentucky Fizzles, ThePostGame (Feb. 26, 2011), http://www.thepostgame.com/ 
blog/throwback/201102/high-school-juniors-college-future-uncertain-after-eighth-grade-com- 
mitbment-ken#; Forde, supra note 1 (reporting that the University of Maryland rescinded 
its offer to Tamir Goodman because Goodman did not live up to his athletic potential); 
Andy Staples, For Elite Recruits, Commitments Aren’t What They Used to Be, SI.com (July 8, 
2010) [hereinafter Staples, Elite Recruits], http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/writers/ 
andy_staples/07/07/committed-players/index.html (“College coaches often whine about 
the lack of actual commitment by their verbal commitments, but their complaints ring hol-
low when they yank scholarship offers because another player became interested in their 
school or when they hand out 200 scholarship offers for a 25-man class. It’s easy to blame the 
17-year-olds for failing to honor their word, but the 45-year-olds are equally at fault in this 
case.”); Andy Staples, Going to Court over Commitment, SI.com (Feb. 29, 2008), http://sportsil- 
lustrated.cnn.com/2008/writers/andy_staples/02/29/hawaii.recruit/index.html (reporting 
a lawsuit over an informal scholarship allegedly withdrawn by the University of Hawaii); Andy 
Staples, Oregon Pulls Written Offer, an Unsavory Move That’s Common, SI.com ( June 23, 2008) 
[hereinafter Staples, Oregon Pulls Offer], http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2008/writers/andy_ 
stap
marily because institutions have the ability to diversify risk over multi-
ple uiting. See infra notes 100–103 and 
acco
les/06/20/notebook.0620/ (reporting that the University of Oregon rescinded a schol-
arship offer to a recruit). 
15 See infra note 100 and accompanying text. Recruits also sometimes change their 
minds about commitments, especially if they are highly sought-after players with many 
options. See Staples, Elite Recruits, supra note 14 (reporting the statement of a highly re-
cruited player that “[i]t’s a verbal commitment . . . I’m still open to every other school. I 
just like Ole Miss better right now.”). Although this does pose a risk for institutions that 
make early commitments, the consequences of broken deals are less severe for institutions 
than for recruits, pri
recruits, existing players, and multiple years of recr
mpanying text. 
16 See infra notes 84–86 and accompanying text. 
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link it more closely to academics.17 First, the proposed rules would pro-
hibit verbal offers of scholarships until after July 1 of a recruit’s junior 
year.18 Second, institutions would need to have on file a high school 
transcript showing five completed semesters or seven completed quar-
ters before extending a scholarship offer.19 This would effectively post-
pone most offers until the second half of the junior year. Although the 
NCAA ultimately rejected this proposal,20 the proposal exemplifies the 
regulatory approach the NCAA plans to use in dealing with early re-
ruitc ment. 
 This Article studies and critiques the regulatory scheme that allows 
early informal commitments and the NCAA’s new efforts at reform. It 
agrees with the NCAA that existing regulations do not adequately con-
trol early recruiting, unfairly pressuring prospective student-athletes to 
make premature decisions that place sports over academics. This does 
not necessarily mean, however, that the recent proposed legislation 
would have effectively dealt with the problem. Although the effort to 
restrict early recruiting and re-emphasize academics is praiseworthy, the 
NCAA would have had extreme difficulty enforcing its proposed ban 
on early informal offers. Schools and recruits occasionally make public 
announcements about their intentions, and the proposed rules would 
                                                                                                                      
17 See Michelle Brutlag Hosick, Cabinet Proposes End to Early Verbal Offers of Aid, NCAA 
( June 24, 2010), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/portal/ncaahome?WCM_GLOBAL_CON TEXT 
=/ncaa/NCAA/NCAA+News/NCAA+News+Online/2010/Division+I/Cabinet+proposes 
+end+to+early+verbal+offers+of+aid_06_24_10_NCAA_News. 
18 See NCAA, Division I Proposal No. 2010-42 (2010) [hereinafter Division I Pro-
posal 2010-42] available at https://web1.ncaa.org/LSDBi/exec/homepage (follow “Search” 
hyperlink; then follow “Division I Proposals” hyperlink; then type “2010-42” in “Proposal 
Number” text box). This proposal would have amended NCAA Bylaw 13.9 by inserting a new 
provision as Bylaw 13.9.1. See id. Proposed Bylaw 13.9.1 reads as follows: 
13.9 LETTER-OF-INTENT PROGRAMS, FINANCIAL AID AGREEMENTS, 
OFFERS OF FINANCIAL AID 
13.9.1 Requirements for Verbal Offer of Athletically Related Financial Aid. An 
institution may make a verbal offer of athletically related financial aid to an 
individual, subject to the following requirements: 
 (a) Such an offer shall not be made to the individual, directly or indirectly, 
before July 1 following the individual’s junior year in high school; and 
 (b) The institution must have a copy of the individual’s high school tran-
script (official or unofficial) on file that includes the results of the individ-
ual’s first five semesters or seven quarters of high school enrollment. 
Id. 
19 Id. 
20 The proposal was rejected by the Division I Legislative Council, in large part due to 
concerns about its enforceability. See David Moltz, NCAA President Answers Critics, Inside 
Higher Ed ( Jan. 14, 2011), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2011/01/14/ncaa_pre-
sident_s_speech_and_updates_from_convention. 
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have stopped that. The DI Cabinet chair admitted, however, that those 
determined to make early informal deals would probably do so without 
detection.21 Given the strong incentives that favor early recruiting and 
the extent to which institutions have traditionally flouted NCAA rules,22 
it is fair to worry that these rules would simply have driven early recruit-
ing further underground, placing even more unfair pressure on re-
rui
her the student plays the sport for the 
niv
to stop people from imbibing.25 When society tried to ban alcohol 
                                                                                                                     
c ts by forcing them to participate in a clandestine market with no 
mechanism to enforce deals that are made. 
 This Article responds to this problem by suggesting that the NCAA 
take a radically different approach to regulating early recruiting.23 In-
stead of making largely futile efforts to prevent institutions and recruits 
from making early informal scholarship deals, the NCAA should allow 
them to make formal binding ones. There would, however, be strings 
attached. For every year before a recruit’s senior year in which an insti-
tution offers a binding commitment, the institution must guarantee the 
scholarship for an additional year. Thus, a senior would get a one-year 
scholarship (the present practice), a junior a two-year scholarship, a 
sophomore three, and a freshman four. These scholarships would be 
guaranteed, regardless of whet
u ersity, and they would further count against the scholarship limita-
tions for the sport in question. 
 This proposal may seem strange to those familiar with the NCAA’s 
traditional “prohibit and punish” approach to regulation. After all, why 
permit the very thing (early scholarship commitments) that causes 
harm to students? The answer to this question lies in the observation 
that it is frequently more effective to permit and regulate certain behav-
iors than to ban them.24 For example, legal but regulated access to al-
cohol probably works better than a complete ban. Society has learned 
that although drinking may be undesirable, it is practically impossible 
 
21 See Hosick, supra note 17. 
22 See infra notes 40–57 and accompanying text for examples of universities’ historical 
attempts to flout NCAA rules. 
23 See infra notes 122--137 and accompanying text. 
24 See Harry G. Levine & Craig Reinarman, Alcohol Prohibition and Drug Prohibition: Les-
sons from Alcohol Policy for Drug Policy, in Drugs and Society 43, 48 (Jefferson M. Fish ed., 
2006) (“It has frequently been observed that drug prohibition tends to drive out the weak-
er and milder forms of drugs and to increase the availability and use of stronger and more 
dangerous drugs.”). 
25 See id. at 50 (giving examples of alcohol regulations used in other countries and not-
ing that these regulations more successfully eliminated social problems related to alcohol 
than the total prohibition tried in the United States). 
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completely, illegal markets flourished, along with harmful side effects 
like fraud and violence.26 Permitting the vice, though perhaps a sec-
ond-best option, ameliorated the side effects without exposing society 
aking the prob-
would probably have done little to improve the problems associated 
                                                                                                                     
to intolerable levels of drinking.27 
 A similar approach to early recruitment is probably wise. As with 
alcohol or gambling, it is probably impossible for the NCAA to wipe out 
early recruiting, and unregulated early recruiting clearly has side ef-
fects harmful to student-athletes. It therefore makes sense to regulate 
early recruiting with rules that make it less harmful to students and less 
attractive to institutions. This Article’s proposal does this in three 
ways.28 First, allowing early commitments will make institutions less ea-
ger to pursue younger recruits by making early recruitment riskier for 
the institutions.29 Second, allowing early commitments will give those 
who participate in early recruiting clear signals about what they are get-
ting.30 Those who sign genuine commitments will get security. Those 
who do not get those offers will know that the schools involved are 
merely prospecting. Recruits will no longer be misled—deliberately or 
mistakenly—about the intentions of universities. Third, the extra schol-
arship guarantees associated with making early binding offers will dis-
courage universities from pursuing younger recruits, m
lems associated with early recruitment less common.31 
 This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides background 
about the history of NCAA regulation.32 Part II lays out the framework 
of modern NCAA sports recruiting, including the basic incentives that 
affect institutions and prospective student-athletes.33 Part III describes 
the recently rejected proposal from the NCAA on the problem of early 
recruitment and explains why the proposed response or similar efforts 
 
26 See id. at 45–46 (noting that after the prohibition of alcohol in the United States, 
“[n]ew institutions and cultural practices appeared: bootleggers and speakeasies, hip flasks 
and bathtub gin, rum runners smuggling in liquor and prohibition agents . . . smashing 
down doors”). 
27 See id. at 59 (“Legalizing alcohol, then regulating it, had accomplished what most 
temperance and prohibition supporters claimed was impossible: alcohol moved from be-
ing a scandal, crisis, and constant front-page news story to something routine and man-
ageable . . . .”). 
28 See infra notes 122–137 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 124–128 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 129–130 and accompanying text. 
31 See infra note 131 and accompanying text. 
32 See infra notes 36–59 and accompanying text. 
33 See infra notes 60–108 and accompanying text. 
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with early recruitment, and may have made them worse.34 Part IV offers 
an alternate response to the problem of early recruitment.35 
I. History of NCAA Regulation 
 According to the NCAA Constitution, collegiate sports are amateur 
recreational activities contained within an educational program de-
voted to the welfare of the student.36 Of particular note, the NCAA’s 
regulation of student-athlete recruiting should “shield them from un-
due pressures that may interfere with the scholastic or athletics interests 
of the prospective student-athletes or their educational institutions.”37 
 These statements of principle are appropriately lofty. Unfortu-
nately, the NCAA has found it rather difficult to govern in a manner 
fully consistent with these statements. Indeed, one can fairly describe 
the NCAA’s regulation of sport as a somewhat futile attempt to shield 
                                                                                                                      
34 See infra notes 109–121 and accompanying text. 
35 See infra notes 122–137 and accompanying text. 
36 See Division I Manual, supra note 7, art. 2.9. 
37 Id. art. 2.11. Other representative sections from the NCAA’s Constitution include 
the following: 
Article 1.3.1: 
The competitive athletics programs of member institutions are designed to be 
a vital part of the educational system. A basic purpose of this Association is to 
maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational pro-
gram and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by so doing, 
retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and pro-
fessional sports. 
. . . 
Article 2.2: 
Intercollegiate athletics programs shall be conducted in a manner designed 
to protect and enhance the physical and educational well-being of student-
athletes. 
. . . 
Article 2.5: 
Intercollegiate athletics programs shall be maintained as a vital component of 
the educational program, and student-athletes shall be an integral part of the 
student body. The admission, academic standing and academic progress of 
student-athletes shall be consistent with the policies and standards adopted by 
the institution for the student body in general. 
. . . 
Article 2.9: 
Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their par-
ticipation should be motivated primarily by education and by the physical, 
mental and social benefits to be derived. Student participation in intercolle-
giate athletics is an avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from 
exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises. 
Id. arts. 1.3.1, 2.2, 2.5, 2.9. 
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college sports from the corrupting influences of professionalization and 
money.38 For most of its history, the NCAA has tried to preserve college 
sports as recreation within an educational setting, but member institu-
tions continually flout, or find loopholes in, the relevant rules because 
they cannot resist the urge to gain competitive advantages any way they 
can.39 
 In the late nineteenth century, no less an institution than the Uni-
versity of Chicago instructed its first football coach (the famous Amos 
Alonzo Stagg) to “develop teams which we can send around the coun-
try and knock out all the colleges. We will give them a palace car and a 
vacation too.”40 The University of Chicago did not act alone. By the 
twentieth century, many colleges and universities eagerly pursued tal-
ented athletes and offered them money to attend school and play foot-
ball with little regard for their academic abilities.41 
 Not surprisingly, calls for reform arose, and in 1905 the Intercolle-
giate Athletic Association of the United States (IAAUS) was founded.42 
Five years later, the IAAUS changed its name to the National Collegiate 
Athletic Association (NCAA).43 From its inception, the NCAA regulated 
both on-field competition (most immediately the growing risk of injury 
associated with football) and off-field matters of recruiting and money. 
The new organization’s rule on amateurism was clear. Universities 
could not offer scholarships or other money based on athletic ability.44 
 Unfortunately, the NCAA had no teeth behind its regulations. 
Universities were on their honor to live up to the principles set forth by 
the NCAA, and many failed to do so.45 Scholarships, under-the-table 
payments, and special jobs with alumni made it clear that universities 
and coaches valued athletic victory and its associated benefits more 
                                                                                                                      
38 See Allen L. Sack & Ellen J. Staurowsky, College Athletes for Hire 11 (1998). 
39 See id. at 19–26. See generally Walter Byers, Unsportsmanlike Conduct: Exploit-
ing College Athletes (1995) (detailing historic examples of rules violations and the 
NCAA’s lack of adequate response to them). 
40 Sack & Staurowsky, supra note 38, at 21. 
41 Id. at 22–24. 
42 About the NCAA: History, NCAA, http://ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/ 
about+the+ncaa/who+we+are/about+the+ncaa+history (last updated Nov. 8, 2010). 
43 Id. 
44 Sack & Staurowsky, supra note 38, at 33. 
45 Joseph N. Crowley, In the Arena: The NCAA’s First Century 15 (Digital ed. 
2006), available at http://ncaapublications.com/DownloadPublication.aspz?download-IN 
ARENA06.pdf (describing the NCAA’s early effort to control recruiting and noting that 
universities themselves, and not the NCAA, were responsible for enforcing rules). 
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than any obligation to live up to the ideals of amateur sport.46 Some-
thing more was clearly needed. 
 Reform arrived in 1948 with the enactment of the so-called “Sanity 
Code” that gave the NCAA power to expel member schools for viola-
tions.47 The Sanity Code did not, however, prove successful. The Code 
permitted limited athletic scholarships and off-campus recruiting, but 
the NCAA’s member institutions refused to enforce the very code they 
had adopted.48 In 1950, the NCAA membership considered the cases of 
the so-called “Seven Sinners,” seven institutions who voluntarily admit-
ted to breaking the rules.49 In defense, one of the Seven Sinners, the 
University of Virginia, argued that the scholarship limitations of the 
Sanity Code were unreasonable because athletes could not play foot-
ball, work at a job, and keep up with school.50 The NCAA membership 
responded by refusing to expel the Seven Sinners, in part because 
many institutions felt it unfair to punish those who publicly admitted 
breaking the rules while many others continued to break the rules se-
cretly.51 This led in turn to the 1951 repeal of the Sanity Code.52 
 The history of the NCAA’s first attempt to regulate amateurism 
and recruiting illustrates a basic problem that persists to this day. No 
matter how hard it tries, the NCAA cannot force its member institu-
tions to commit fully to the ideals of amateur sport incidental to educa-
tion. The NCAA tried to prohibit athletic scholarships, but universities 
would not go along. Then, when the NCAA accepted limited scholar-
ships but tried to enforce its rules, the membership again rebelled, in 
part because violations of the rules were sufficiently widespread that it 
seemed unfair to punish those who voluntarily admitted their behavior. 
                                                                                                                      
46 Sack & Staurowsky, supra note 38, at 35–40 (describing widespread violation of 
rules that the NCAA did not have power to enforce). 
47 See Gary T. Brown, NCAA Answers Call to Reform, NCAA (Nov. 22, 1999), http://web1.ncaa. 
org/web_files/NCAANewsArchive/1999/19991122/active/3624n24.html (describing adoption 
of Sanity Code and its problems). 
48 See Byers, supra note 39, at 53–55 (describing the unwillingness of universities to 
punish confessed violators of rules while others who did not confess continued to violate 
them); Sack & Staurowsky, supra note 38, at 45–46 (describing same); Sport: What Price 
Football?, Time, Jan. 23, 1950, at 46 available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/ 
article/0,9171,858594,00.html (describing the Sanity Code and universities refusing to 
vote to enforce its provisions); Brown, supra note 47 (explaining that many institutions 
considered the penalty of expulsion too harsh). 
49 See Byers, supra note 39, at 53–54; Sport: What Price Football?, supra note 48, at 46. 
50 See Byers, supra note 39, at 54. 
51 See id. 
52 See Brown, supra note 47. 
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 Even today, NCAA institutions frequently break well-known rules 
against improper payments to players and the use of academically in-
eligible players. In 2009, the NCAA sanctioned Florida State University 
because the school’s University Athletic Support Services helped more 
than sixty athletes in ten different sports cheat on exams.53 This assis-
tance included the provision of answers to exams.54 In 2010, the NCAA 
penalized the University of Arizona for, among other things, a scheme 
in which the men’s basketball program circumvented recruiting restric-
tions by helping an ostensibly unaffiliated promoter run a basketball 
tournament.55 The Arizona Cactus Classic took place in the university’s 
facilities with the knowledge and assistance of the basketball coach and 
boosters.56 Also in 2010, the NCAA punished the University of South-
ern California for improper benefits received from an agent by star 
running back Reggie Bush.57 
 Each of these violations involved deliberate flouting of NCAA rules. 
It seems highly unlikely that any of them could have occurred without 
the knowledge and complicity of people bearing primary responsibility 
for compliance with those rules. Indeed, the frequency of violations 
such as these strongly suggests that far too many NCAA member institu-
tions are perfectly willing to break rules when doing so provides a com-
petitive advantage in sports. A cynic could easily argue that NCAA rules 
generally fail to stop cheating, but instead drive it underground where 
ever more unsavory characters and practices can get involved. 
 The NCAA’s regulation of early recruitment is no different. It is 
abundantly clear that the NCAA wants its members to avoid serious ath-
letic scholarship commitments until a recruit’s senior year, yet member 
institutions routinely pursue commitments from the very underclass-
                                                                                                                      
53 See Press Release, NCAA, Division I Committee on Infractions Issues Decision on 
Florida State University (Mar. 6, 2009), available at http://web1.ncaa.org/web_files/Press 
Archive/2009/Infractions/20090306_d1_coi_fsu_rls.html. For more on eligibility require-
ments for NCAA student-athletes, see Kelly M. Trainor, Note, The NCAA’s Initial Eligibility 
Requirements and the Americans with Disabilities Act in the Post-PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin Era: An 
Argument in Favor of Deference to the NCAA, 46 B.C. L. Rev. 423, 434–36 (2005). 
54 See id. 
55 See Stacey Osburn, University of Arizona Men’s Basketball Program Penalized, NCAA (July 29, 
2010), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/resources/latest+news/2010+ 
news+stories/july+latest+news/university+of+arizona+basketball+program+penalized. 
56 See id. 
57 See Erick Smith, NCAA Hammers Southern Cal’s Football Program with Two-Year Postseason 
Ban, USA Today, June 10, 2010, http://content.usatoday.com/communities/campusrivalry/ 
post/2010/06/ncaa-hammers-southern-cals-football-program-with-two-year-postseason-ban/1 
(including link to NCAA report). 
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men who should be left alone.58 The NCAA could respond by passing 
rules to stop this pursuit, but the rules would likely prove ineffective 
because institutions will secretly conduct business as usual in ways that 
exacerbate the problems of early recruitment.59 
II. The Modern Recruiting Framework 
 Existing NCAA regulations admirably try to curb the worst excesses 
of recruiting, but member institutions have vigorously exploited loop-
holes to do the very things the NCAA has tried to stop.60 The result is a 
system that exacerbates the problems of early recruiting by pressuring 
student-athletes to make premature decisions about college without 
genuine assurance that their choices will be honored. This Part first 
describes the NCAA’s recruiting rules and the loopholes that institu-
tions have used to evade them.61 It then explores the basic incentives 
for student-athletes and institutions to exploit the loopholes.62 This 
Part concludes by discussing the risks and rewards associated with bro-
ken non-binding commitments and explaining that these broken 
commitments harm student-athletes more than institutions.63 
                                                                                                                     
A. NCAA Recruiting Rules and Loopholes 
 NCAA rules and the National Letter of Intent Process govern the 
recruiting of Division I NCAA student-athletes. The National Letter of 
Intent (NLI) is a voluntary program for universities and student-
athletes that specifies exactly when a student-athlete may sign a binding 
commitment to attend a university in exchange for an athletic scholar-
ship.64 These dates vary by sport, but they all fall within the student-
athlete’s senior year of high school.65 Once a student-athlete signs a 
letter of intent, he or she becomes committed to attend the particular 
school and play the sport, and the school becomes obligated to give the 
student-athlete the specific scholarship mentioned in the letter of in-
 
58 See Allis, supra note 1; Forde, supra note 1; Giglio & Tysiac, supra note 1; How Does a 
College Coach Offer a Sophomore or Freshman During the Football Recruiting Process?, supra note 1. 
59 See infra notes 109–121 and accompanying text. 
60 See infra notes 64–79 and accompanying text. 
61 See infra notes 64–79 and accompanying text. 
62 See infra notes 80–87 and accompanying text. 
63 See infra notes 88–108 and accompanying text. 
64 See About the National Letter of Intent (NLI), supra note 12. 
65 See Signing Dates, Nat’l Letter of Intent, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/ 
nli/NLI/Signing+Dates/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2011) (listing signing dates for students enroll-
ing in 2011–2012). 
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tent.66 This formal commitment has consequences beyond the quid 
pro quo of attendance and scholarship. Other schools must stop re-
cruiting student-athletes who have signed letters of intent.67 Addition-
ally, student-athletes who decide to attend a school other than the one 
with which they signed the NLI must generally sit out a year and give 
up a year of eligibility in all sports.68 Practically every Division I institu-
tion participates in the NLI program (the exceptions being the Ivy 
League schools, which do not offer athletic scholarships, and the Ser-
vice Academies), making it effectively impossible for a student-athlete 
to make a formal, binding scholarship deal before his or her senior 
year.69 NCAA rules support the NLI process by prohibiting formal ac-
ceptance of an athletic scholarship until the relevant NLI date has 
ass
     
p ed.70 
 NCAA rules further control early recruiting in four ways. First, the 
rules prohibit coaches from visiting or casually encountering recruits in 
situations where recruiting might occur until after a student-athlete’s 
junior year in high school.71 Second, the rules restrict telephone calls 
to the student’s senior year and also limit the number of calls.72 Third, 
universities cannot send letters or other written recruiting materials to 
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66 See About the National Letter of Intent (NLI), supra note 12. 
67 See NLI Provisions: Recruiting Ban After Signing, Nat’l Letter of Intent, http://
www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/nli/NLI/NLI+Provisions/Recruiting+Ban+After+
 visited Feb. 5, 2011) (establishing a recruiting ban after the signing of an NLI). 
68 See NLI Provisions: Basic Penalty, Nat’l Letter of Intent, http://www.ncaa.o
/wcm/connect/nli/NLI/NLI+Provisions/Basic+Penalty (last visited Feb. 5, 2011). 
69 See Frequently Asked Questions: If I Sign with an NCAA Division I Institution, May I Still 
Sign with a Division II Institution?, Nat’l Letter of Intent, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ 
wcm/connect/nli/NLI/Frequently+Asked+Questions/ (fol
w ninth numbered hyperlink (last visited Feb. 25, 20
70 See Division I Manual, supra note 7, art. 13.9.2. 
71 See id. art. 13.1.1 (“Off-campus recruiting contacts shall not be made with an indi-
vidual (or his or her relatives or legal guardians) before July 1 following the completion of 
his or her junior year in high school . . . .”). Article 13.02.4 of the NCAA Bylaws defines 
“contact” as “any face-to-face encounter between a prospective student-athlete or the pro-
spective student-athlete’s parents, relatives or legal guardians and an institutional staff 
member or athletics representative du
nge of a greeting.” Id. art. 13.02.4. 
72 See id. art. 13.1.3.1 (“Telephone calls to an individual (or his or her relatives or legal 
guardians) may not be made before July 1 following the completion of his or her junior 
year in high school (subject to the exceptions below); thereafter, staff members shall not 
make such telephone calls more than once per week.”). Specific exceptions for a number 
of sports, including men’s football and men’s and women’s basketball, modify this general 
provision by permitting limited telephone calls in the junior or sophomore year. See id. art. 
13.1.3.1.2–4. Nevertheless, the principle remains the same—c
imited to give student-athletes room to le
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recruits until their junior year.73 Finally, schools may pay for a recruit to 
visit the campus only once during the recruit’s senior year,74 and re-
ui
entives 
 ex
cepted.77 These deals are non-binding in that neither party can enforce 
                                                                                                                     
cr ts are limited to a total of five such visits.75 
 The above-described rules ostensibly take the pressure off of ath-
letic recruits by keeping options open and restricting communication 
from institutions to underclassmen. If no student can make binding 
decisions until his or her senior year, then a prospective recruit need 
do nothing before then because waiting costs nothing. Unfortunately, 
things do not work out this way because the structure of the market for 
athletic recruits gives universities and student-athletes strong inc
to ploit loopholes to do exactly what the NCAA discourages.76 
 For purposes of this analysis, three important loopholes exist in the 
NCAA rules. First, although college coaches cannot meet with student-
athletes off campus until their senior year, nothing prevents on-campus 
face-to-face meetings. Second, although coaches cannot call students 
until their senior year, nothing stops prospective student-athletes from 
calling coaches and discussing any topic, including scholarships. Third, 
nothing stops college coaches from telling people who may know a par-
ticular student-athlete—perhaps a coach, mentor, or other mutual ac-
quaintance—that the coach is interested in a particular player. Together, 
these loopholes make it possible for a university to inform recruits of 
the university’s interest well before the dates contemplated by NCAA 
rules, and arrange for substantive on-campus or telephone conversa-
tions during which scholarships can be informally offered and ac-
 
73
 until June 
15 at the conclusion of his or her sophomore year in high school. 
Id. 
opening day of classes of the pro-
spe enior year in high school.”). 
 
 See id. art 13.4.1. The bylaws require: 
In sports other than men’s basketball and men’s ice hockey, a member insti-
tution shall not provide recruiting materials, including general correspon-
dence related to athletics, to an individual (or his or her parents or legal 
guardians) until September 1 at the beginning of his or her junior year in 
high school. In men’s basketball and men’s ice hockey, an institution shall not 
provide recruiting materials, including general correspondence related to 
athletics, to an individual (or his or her parents or legal guardians)
74 See id. art. 13.6.2.1 (“A member institution may finance only one visit to its campus 
for a prospective student-athlete.”); id. art. 13.6.2.2.1 (“A prospective student-athlete may 
not be provided an expense-paid visit earlier than the 
ctive student-athlete’s s
75 See id. art. 13.6.2.2. 
76 See supra notes 5–7 and accompanying text. 
77 See Klein, supra note 2 (describing how the University of Southern California made 
contact with an eighth grader by asking an intermediary to give him Head Coach Lane 
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them, and no consequences such as loss of eligibility follow from break-
ing one of these deals. This does not mean, however, that the parties do 
not take them seriously. Although not all deals are honored,78 many in-
stitutions and recruits live up to their informal obligations.79 
B. Basic Incentives for Institutions and Student-Athletes 
 The incentives to exploit these loopholes originate in the competi-
tion among universities for student-athletes. Schools obviously differ in 
their ability to attract players. A “big time” program frequently signs the 
most desired recruits, leaving lesser programs with fewer options from 
which to choose. Nevertheless, each school has peers against whom it 
competes for similarly gifted recruits. This puts the coaches who recruit 
in an interesting situation. 
 Coaches rationally prefer to recruit from as large a pool as possible 
because the large number increases the chance of finding able players. 
This chance increases if the coach can somehow reduce the number of 
competitor schools recruiting from the same pool. A coach who believes 
that he or she can persuade recruits to accept an early scholarship offer 
therefore has considerable incentive to recruit before the senior year to 
avoid competition from those waiting until then.80 This in turn creates 
incentives to begin recruiting even earlier and earlier. Once a few 
coaches begin recruiting early, others will follow suit and crowd the 
market. Some coaches will respond by recruiting even earlier, again 
leading others to follow suit.81 This push towards early recruiting will 
                                                                                                                      
Kiffin’s number); How Does a College Coach Offer a Sophomore or Freshman During the Football 
 
Recruiting Process?, supra note 1 (describing the process of extending scholarships to un-
derclassmen). 
78 See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text. 
79 See Mordecai Browner, What Good Is a Verbal Commitment?, Bleacher Rep. ( July 19, 
2006), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/205-what-good-is-a-verbal-commitment (describ-
ing as ethical the practice of honoring non-binding verbal commitments and criticizing as 
unethical those who do not honor them); David La Vaque, Verbal Commitments: A Lot of Talk?, 
USCHO ( June 22, 2004), http://old.uscho.com/news/college-hockey/id,8549/VerbalCom-
mitmentsALotofTalk.html (reporting on one coach who always honors verbal commitments 
but recognizes the possibility that the practice may change); Gary Parrish, Verbal Commit-
ments? Not Big Problem, Can’t Be Fixed, so Move on, CBS Sports (Aug. 30, 2006), http://www. 
cbssports.com/collegebasketball/story/9628045/1 (reporting a coach’s statement that “94 
out of 100” college basketball coaching staffs take informal early commitments seriously). 
80 See Forde, supra note 1 (“‘In recruiting,’ said one assistant coach of a top-10 pro-
gram, ‘it’s all about being first. If you get in on the kid in eighth grade, you’re first.’”). 
81 See Gregory, supra note 3, at 57 (reporting Scout.com claim that number of high 
school juniors committing to early non-binding scholarship deals increased 430% from 
2003–2007); Dave Hanneman, Give Recruits Time to Grow up, Courier (Findlay, Oh.) ( June 
29, 2010), http://thecourier.com/Sports/columns/2010/Jun/DH/ar_DH_062910.asp?d= 
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stop only when coaches perceive that they can no longer make suffi-
ciently informed recruiting decisions because the athletes are too young 
to indicate clearly how good they will be when they enter college, or 
when athletes refuse to accept early scholarship offers because they real-
ize that their preferences may change. 
 Student-athletes have similar incentives. They would like to be re-
cruited when the most scholarships are available, and they would like to 
avoid competition from other recruits. Accordingly, when coaches begin 
committing scholarships before the senior year, student-athletes will ea-
gerly pursue deals for two reasons. First, waiting means a reduction in 
the number of available scholarships.82 Indeed, coaches sometimes pres-
sure recruits by pitting them against one another in a race to accept a 
single available scholarship.83 Second, negotiating early reduces the 
number of competitors unless all potential recruits do likewise. These 
incentives predispose student-athletes to respond positively when institu-
tions offer early commitments. Indeed, aggressive student-athletes may 
respond to early offers by pressing other institutions for better offers, 
thereby increasing the momentum and pressure of early recruiting. 
 These basic incentives explain why existing NCAA rules do so little 
to slow informal early commitment. Institutions and recruits will always 
act in their perceived self-interest, so unless the NCAA changes existing 
incentives, behavior will not change. Indeed, the NCAA’s well-inten-
tioned prohibition against binding early commitment actually increases 
the attractiveness of early recruitment by largely eliminating the associ-
ated risks. 
 An institution will refrain from making early commitments when 
dangers associated with early commitment, particularly the possibility 
of incorrectly measuring a player’s athletic potential, outweigh the per-
ceived benefits. If an institution knows that it must honor every early 
commitment it makes, the institution will not spend one of its precious 
scholarships unless it is quite confident about a recruit’s athletic poten-
tial.84 This means waiting until the recruit is old enough to make his 
collegiate potential fairly clear. If an institution knows that it does not 
                                                                                                                      
062910,2010,Jun,29&c=sc_2 (asserting that institutions recruit earlier and earlier to keep 
up with their competitors). 
82 See NCAA Membership & Academic Affairs Staff, supra note 7, art. 15.5 (estab-
lishing limits on the number of scholarships available to each institution in Division I 
sports). 
83 See Pennington, supra note 9. 
84 See Forde, supra note 1 (reporting that Kentucky’s men’s basketball coach stated 
“there’s a bigger chance of misevaluation, the earlier it is”). 
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have to honor its commitments, however, it can afford to behave more 
aggressively. Scholarship offers can be made to younger recruits be-
cause the absence of a binding commitment acts as insurance against 
mistakes. If an institution decides that a player is not as good as previ-
ously thought, the institution merely disavows its commitment, freeing 
the scholarship for use on another recruit.85 To be sure, an institution 
that frequently backs out of early commitments may lose enough credi-
bility to scare away future recruits. Nevertheless, the continuing exis-
tence of both early informal commitment and broken deals suggests 
that the cost of occasionally canceling an early scholarship deal is lower 
than the benefits of making progressively earlier informal commit-
ments.86 
 Like institutions, student-athletes who seek early commitments risk 
getting stuck with a deal that later proves undesirable. Here too, the 
NCAA’s elimination of early binding commitment has made it easier for 
recruits to participate in early recruiting. Remember, a student-athlete 
breaking a binding letter of intent commitment would lose eligibility 
and have to sit out a year of participation in athletics,87 but a recruit who 
changes his or her mind about an informal early commitment can sim-
ply back out. Indeed, it is likely that the costs of breaking commitments 
are even lower for recruits than institutions because recruits do not 
need to maintain a reputation for honoring commitments. The only 
party a recruit needs to convince is the next school to which he or she 
commits. Because that school already knows that it is inducing someone 
to break an existing commitment, the recruit’s reputation probably 
plays a relatively low role in the deal-making process. 
C. The Broken Commitment 
 The foregoing shows why institutions and student-athletes vigor-
ously pursue early recruitment, as well as the exacerbating effect that 
existing NCAA rules unintentionally provide.88 This state of affairs con-
tradicts the NCAA’s professed commitment to the primacy of academics 
in the life of the student-athlete.89 There is, however, much more for a 
student-athlete who enters the early recruiting market. He or she must 
                                                                                                                      
85 See id. (“In a field this tenaciously competitive, being first is a powerful incentive. 
And if you end up first on a kid who doesn’t develop, well, it’s always easy enough to dis-
engage from a verbal commitment.”). 
86 See Hanneman, supra note 81 (reporting increased use of early commitments). 
87 See NLI Provisions: Basic Penalty, supra note 68. 
88 See supra notes 80–87 and accompanying text. 
89 See Division I Manual, supra note 7, art. 2.9. 
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deal not only with the pressure of making a premature commitment 
about college, but also the possibility that agreements will not be hon-
ored.90 Although institutions and recruits both face this uncertainty, re-
cruits poignantly and unfairly bear its worst side effects because institu-
tions can effectively hedge their bets and diversify risk.91 This leaves 
recruits in a position where they may feel helpless and potentially co-
erced into making the very premature decisions the NCAA wants to dis-
courage. 
 Early commitments get broken for many reasons. Players some-
times change their minds.92 A better, previously uninterested recruit 
may contact a coach.93 A coach may decide that a recruited player has 
not lived up to his potential.94 A coach may leave the school.95 Regard-
less of the reason for broken commitments, schools and recruits alike 
must plan for the possibility that they will rely on a promise that evapo-
rates, because broken promises, even informal ones, impose meaningful 
costs on the jilted party, primarily in the form of foregone opportunity.96 
 There are two rational responses to the possibility of a broken early 
commitment. First, a party could look for signals about seriousness of 
commitment. Second, a party could formulate alternate plans against 
                                                                                                                      
90 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
91 See infra note 103 and accompanying text. 
92 See, e.g., John Carroll, De-commitments Part of Recruiting’s Ugly Side, ESPN (Nov. 1, 2006), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/recruiting/columns/story?columnist=carroll_john&id=264 
5863 (discussing recruits who change their minds after making verbal commitments); Andy 
Staples, Brown Saga Reveals Recruiting Flaws; Here’s How to Fix Them, SI.com (Mar. 16, 2009), 
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2009/writers/andy_staples/03/16/brown-tennessee/index. 
html (discussing same). 
93 See, e.g., Bruce Pascoe, UA Rescinds Scholarship Offer, Ariz. Daily Star, Sept. 30, 
2008, at C1, available at http://azstarnet.com/sports/basketball/college/wildcats/arti-
cle_61f3cd46-116a-5843-9c05-ecfa76503b39.html (noting that the University of Arizona re-
scinded a scholarship offer after receiving commitments from other players and deciding 
to go “in a different direction”). 
94 See, e.g., Jason Bodnar, M. Hoops Frosh Files Suit Against Northwestern, Daily Pennsyl-
vanian, Mar. 29, 2000, http://www.dailypennsylvanian.com/node/19978 (reporting that 
Northwestern University allegedly withdrew a scholarship that a recruit had accepted, and 
told the recruit’s father that the recruit could no longer help the team); Forde, supra note 
1 (noting that the University of Maryland rescinded an offer to Tamir Goodman after con-
cluding he was not as good as originally thought). 
95 See, e.g., Jeff Elliott, Wolfson’s Rozier to Sign with Jacksonville University After FIU Reversal, 
Fla. Times Union, Apr. 23, 2009, http://jacksonville.com/sports/high_school/2009-04-23/ 
story/wolfsons_rozier_to_sign_with_jacksonville_university_after_fiu_r (reporting that Flor-
ida International University withdrew an apparent commitment after a change in head 
coach). 
96 For example, a school that promises a scholarship to a recruit passes up the oppor-
tunity to fill that slot with a different player. Similarly, a recruit who accepts an informal 
scholarship promises that he or she will not accept a similar offer from another school. 
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the contingency that a promise gets broken. For better or worse, exist-
ing NCAA regulations make it effectively impossible for schools and 
recruits alike to send and receive reassuring signals of early commit-
ment.97 If the NCAA allowed early binding commitments, schools and 
recruits could sign enforceable written agreements. Indeed, this is pre-
cisely what happens during a student’s senior year when he or she signs 
a letter of intent,98 and it separates those who are merely “window 
shopping” from those who truly want to commit. Without this possibil-
ity, however, there is no way for a school or recruit to determine if the 
other party is serious. Both sides must simply accept unenforceable 
verbal assurances—precisely the same assurances given by a party who 
is trying to deceive the other.99 The unclear signals about seriousness of 
purpose mean that parties must rely on contingency plans to hedge the 
risk of broken early commitments, and it is here that recruits face pres-
sures much more severe than those faced by schools. 
 Schools and recruits have significantly different options for deal-
ing with this risk. Consider first the option available to recruits. A re-
cruit can protect him- or herself against a school that breaks an early 
commitment only by finding an alternate scholarship, but doing this 
jeopardizes the very commitment upon which the recruit hopes to rely. 
Schools that offer informal early commitments understandably expect 
committed recruits to stop courting other schools.100 Accordingly, a 
recruit who tries to make contingency plans must violate the very un-
derstanding upon which his preferred deal rests. If a coach finds out 
that a committed recruit is discussing things with another school, it is 
only natural to conclude that the recruit is not truly serious about hon-
oring his commitment and to begin recruiting other players in antici-
                                                                                                                      
97 See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text. 
98 See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
99 For example, a recruit who asks a coach for a better assurance may be told, “I’d give 
you a written agreement right now if I could, but I’m giving you everything the NCAA will 
let me give you.” Similarly, recruits asked about their intentions may say, “Coach, I’ll sign a 
letter of intent right now,” knowing that no such letter could be given. 
100 See Jeff Call, BYU Football: Cougars Rescind Scholarship Offer to Hawaiian Prep Star, De-
seret News, Jan. 29, 2010, http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700005774/BYU-football-
Cougars-rescind-scholarship-offer-to-Hawaiian-prep-star.html (reporting that BYU withdrew 
from an early commitment when a recruit took a visit to Notre Dame); Jeff Hood, Georgia Tech 
Rescinds Scholarship Offer to Florida QB After Auburn Trip, Palm Beach Daily News, Feb. 2, 2009, 
http://www.palmbeachdailynews.com/sports/content/shared-blogs/ajc/cfbrecruit/entries/ 
2009/02/02/georgia_tech_pu.html (reporting that Georgia Tech withdrew from an early 
commitment with a player because the recruit took an official visit to another school). 
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pation of a broken deal.101 Of course, a recruit could try to conduct 
secret negotiations for backup plans, but such an effort would likely 
fail, because the coaching community is small and coaches frequently 
exchange information about the players they are recruiting.102 
                                                                                                                     
 By contrast, institutions face no impediment to making contingency 
plans. They can freely recruit other players without jeopardizing exist-
ing commitments because it is completely normal for schools to recruit 
multiple players.103 Recruits who discover that schools are interested in 
other players are therefore less likely to worry about broken commit-
ments than schools learning that their supposedly committed recruits 
are interested in other schools. Accordingly, broken commitments are 
not as catastrophic for schools as they are for recruits. A school that loses 
a recruit can usually replace him or her with another recruit, someone 
from the existing roster, or even a recruit from a future year. 
 In short, to use the jargon of risk aversion, recruits suffer more 
than schools from the possibility of broken early commitments because 
recruits cannot effectively manage the risk of disappointment through 
diversification. Recruits are one-time players in the early commitment 
game, and those who try to court multiple prospects actually damage 
their chances of keeping commitments they have.104 By contrast, schools 
are repeat players who easily diversify risk over multiple recruits and 
multiple recruiting years. Accordingly, coaches may worry that early re-
cruits will break their commitments, but they know that they will not 
suffer catastrophic consequences because alternate plans will have been 
made.105 Recruits have no such luxury. 
 It is, of course, possible to defend the present scheme of early re-
cruitment. Recruits and institutions both know that binding deals can-
not be made until the letter-of-intent date arrives.106 They both should 
know that the promises made in recruiting sometimes amount to sweet 
nothings upon which no one should rely.107 Because institutions and 
 
101 See Call, supra note 100 (reporting that BYU does not approve of committed players 
visiting other schools). 
102 See Pennington, supra note 9 (reporting on a coach who said, “what [players] don’t 
know is that we coaches all talk to each other, and we know the truth”). 
103 See Staples, Oregon Pulls Offer, supra note 14 (reporting that some coaches make two 
hundred to three hundred scholarship offers when they have only twenty-five scholarships 
available). 
104 See Call, supra note 100 (reporting that BYU withdrew an offer after a recruit visited 
another school); Hood, supra note 100 (reporting same). 
105 See Staples, Oregon Pulls Offer, supra note 14. 
106 See About the National Letter of Intent (NLI), supra note 12. 
107 See Pascoe, supra note 93 (noting rescinded scholarship offer); Bodnar, supra note 
94 (noting same); Elliott, supra note 95 (noting same); Forde, supra note 1 (noting same). 
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recruits both occasionally suffer from broken informal commitments, 
the participants in early recruiting meet as equals, “big boys” who un-
derstand that it is sometimes necessary to trust a relative stranger and 
skirt the spirit of rules to get things one wants. Indeed, the process of 
early recruitment arguably teaches student-athletes about the impor-
tance and value of honoring one’s word. 
 There is undoubtedly some appeal in this defense of early re-
cruitment. One should remember, however, that these informal deals 
are not made between two experienced, savvy adults. Instead, they in-
volve offers from experienced, repeat-player institutions making unen-
forceable promises to single-player minors, teenagers who probably do 
not understand the intricacies of the rules, customs, and risks they en-
counter.108 When one considers that universities do not suffer the con-
sequences of broken commitments the way recruits do, it looks like the 
current system of early recruitment allows universities to exploit the 
inexperience and insecurity of recruits to push recruits into premature 
decisions about college without giving the certainty that recruits de-
serve in return. 
III. The NCAA Response: A Proposed Rule 
 The NCAA may not understand exactly how its existing regulations 
exacerbate the problems of early recruiting, but it does know that the 
problem is getting out of hand and is trying to do something about 
it.109 The reasons for this may not be entirely noble. Although some will 
support action to curtail early recruiting out of concern for the inter-
ests of recruits, others will support it to spare institutions from the risks 
associated with early judgments about the ability of prospective student-
athletes.110 Nevertheless, in 2010 the DI Cabinet began reviewing Divi-
sion I recruiting rules, taking comments from coaches and other inter-
                                                                                                                      
108 See Bodnar, supra note 94 (discussing an instance where a coach sent an early e-mail 
to a recruit entitled “Scholarship Offer” but later denied offering him a scholarship). 
109 See Division I Proposal 2010-42, supra note 18. 
110 See Don Kausler, Jr., Saban Doesn’t Support NCAA Proposal to Limit Support Staffs, Ala. 
Live Blog ( June 29, 2010, 4:56PM), http://blog.al.com/tide-source/2010/06/saban_ 
doesnt_support_ncaa_prop.html. Alabama football coach Nick Saban stated: 
Guys get offered so early now, you really don’t have a chance to evaluate 
them. That’s not really fair to the young man or the institution, because if 
they early commit and they aren’t what you thought they were, whether it’s 
personally, academically or athletically, it can be a potentially tough situation 
for either side. 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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ested parties. In late June 2010, the DI Cabinet proposed legislation 
prohibiting early offers of financial aid.111 Under the proposed rule, 
which was ultimately rejected by the Division I Legislative Council, insti-
tutions could not make verbal athletic scholarship offers until July 1 of 
a recruit’s junior year.112 Additionally, institutions would need to have 
on file a recruit’s high school transcript showing five completed semes-
ters or seven completed quarters before extending a verbal offer.113 
Ironically, the proposed rule also permitted coaches to call recruits 
even earlier than present rules do. Coaches could make one call per 
month on or after June 15 of a recruit’s sophomore year and two calls 
per week after August 1 of the senior year.114 
 The DI Cabinet undoubtedly wanted its proposal to relieve the 
pressure on student-athletes to make premature decisions about col-
lege, but it probably would have had little effect on existing practices 
and possibly would have made things worse. In theory, prohibition 
against early informal scholarship offers eliminates the incentive that 
institutions have to recruit early.115 Coaches who recruit before a re-
cruit’s junior year do not gain a meaningful competitive advantage be-
cause institutions can offer nothing. All potential recruits will therefore 
be available when offers can be made in the junior year. Likewise, pro-
spective student athletes have no need to make premature decisions 
about college because nothing can happen until the junior year. 
 In practice, however, the DI Cabinet’s proposal would probably not 
have worked as advertised. As an initial matter, the proposal still permit-
ted business as usual during the junior year. More importantly, the 
NCAA would have had great difficulty enforcing the rule because the 
basic incentives to recruit early remain,116 and violations would have 
been almost impossible to detect. Nothing in the proposal stops coaches 
and recruits from communicating as they do now during unofficial visits 
or in telephone conversations initiated by recruits,117 and there is no 
way to monitor what promises get made during private conversations. 
                                                                                                                      
111 See Hosick, supra note 17. 
112 See Division I Proposal 2010-42, supra note 18. For more on the proposal’s rejec-
tion, see Moltz, supra note 20. 
113 See id. 
114 See Hosick, supra note 17. 
115 See supra notes 80–86 and accompanying text. 
116 See Forde, supra note 1 (discussing coaches’ desire to be the first to recruit a play-
er); Hanneman, supra note 81 (asserting that institutions recruit earlier and earlier to 
keep up with competitors). 
117 See How Does a College Coach Offer a Sophomore or Freshman During the Football Recruiting 
Process?, supra note 1 (describing methods coaches use to circumvent recruiting rules). 
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Granted, institutions theoretically cannot make even informal offers 
without the necessary transcripts on file. Institutions anxious to jump 
the gun can skirt this problem, however, by entering into supposedly 
informal understandings about non-binding offers to be made when the 
time for making informal scholarship deals arrives. Accordingly, the DI 
Cabinet’s proposal bore considerable resemblance to existing rules that 
supposedly postpone scholarship commitments until a recruit’s senior 
year.118 These rules may offer reminders about how institutions ought to 
behave, but in the end competitive pressure will drive many to ignore 
lofty principle for the pursuit of competitive advantage. 
 If institutions began flouting or skirting the DI Cabinet’s proposed 
rule, the pressure faced by student-athletes would likely have gotten 
worse. One of the major problems that recruits presently face is the in-
ability to tell whether an informal commitment will be kept.119 Things 
are bad enough when coaches and recruits reach explicit informal ear-
ly deals, and the proposed rule would have encouraged institutions to 
behave in ways that increase uncertainty. Coaches who want to recruit 
early but avoid outright violation of the rule will, as noted above, create 
oblique understandings that amount to scholarship offers.120 Even if 
the winking and nodding is explicit enough to signal clear intention, 
recruits will understandably be nervous about whether they properly 
understand what is going on. Imagine the dialog: 
Recruit: “Coach, I’m really excited about playing for you and 
your school. Can I count on getting a scholarship?” 
Coach: “Well, NCAA rules won’t let me offer you one. So let 
me say this. You’re a fine player, the kind of player who can 
make an immediate impact as a freshman. If you got a schol-
arship offer from us when the rules allow it, will you accept it? 
Can we count on you being a member of our team?” 
Recruit: “Well gee Coach, sure.” 
Coach: “Good. Just trust me, and things will work the way you 
want.” 
What is a recruit supposed to do in response to such a conversation? 
He or she has all of the uncertainty created by the existing rules, plus 
the uncertainty of not knowing if the coach was really extending a firm 
                                                                                                                      
118 Division I Manual, supra note 7, art. 13.9.2 (prohibiting formal acceptance of an 
athletic scholarship until the NLI signing date has passed). 
119 See Pascoe, supra note 93 (noting rescinded scholarship offer); Bodnar, supra note 
94 (noting same); Elliott, supra note 95 (noting same); Forde, supra note 1 (noting same). 
120 See supra notes 90–102 and accompanying text. 
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deal. This extra uncertainty would normally give a recruit even more 
reason to talk with other schools and make contingency plans, but do-
ing so would still expose the recruit to the risk that the coach will dis-
cover the recruit’s interest in other schools and begin looking for a re-
placement.121 In short, the DI Cabinet’s recently rejected proposal 
would probably not have made things any better for prospective stu-
dent-athletes, and it may have made things a lot worse. 
IV. Real Reform and a Proposal 
 The foregoing shows that the NCAA cannot significantly reduce 
the undesirable consequences of early recruiting simply by prohibiting 
institutions from making early scholarship offers.122 Such regulation 
may be simple and direct, but it does little to change underlying incen-
tives that encourage institutions and student-athletes to seek early 
commitment.123 Accordingly, reform will be effective only if it makes 
early recruiting less attractive. 
 This Article’s earlier analysis showed that institutions pursue early 
commitments because they perceive that the benefits outweigh the 
costs.124 Those who recruit early have a better chance of landing top 
talent because they enter the market before competitors do. This sets 
up a race in which coaches feel compelled to recruit earlier and earlier 
in order to get to recruits before the competition.125 The primary curb 
on this race is the possibility that early judgments about athletic talent 
will prove mistaken. This risk increases as institutions recruit earlier 
and earlier.126 At some point, the risk will outweigh the benefit of early 
recruitment. If institutions can cancel any commitments they make, 
however, as indeed they can under present rules, the risk of early re-
cruitment falls. Indeed, it is likely that the NCAA has unwittingly in-
creased the attractiveness of early recruitment by essentially making all 
early commitments non-binding. 
 It is highly unlikely that many of these basic incentives can be 
changed. As long as coaches compete for recruits, there will be an in-
centive to beat the competition to the punch. It is, however, possible to 
                                                                                                                      
121 See Call, supra note 100 (reporting on the withdrawal of a scholarship offer because 
a recruit visited another school); Hood, supra note 100 (reporting same). 
122 See supra notes 60–79 and accompanying text. 
123 See supra notes 60–79 and accompanying text. 
124 See supra notes 80–87 and accompanying text.  
125 See Forde, supra note 1; see also supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text. 
126 See Forde, supra note 1. 
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change the nature of early recruiting bargains in ways that make early 
commitments less attractive to institutions and less stressful for recruits. 
 For example, consider what would happen if the NCAA allowed 
early binding commitments.127 Coaches would become more cautious 
about extending early offers because they would have to live with their 
mistakes. Very few high school freshman athletes are sure bets. A coach 
who can back out of a deal may take a chance on a scholarship prom-
ise. But if things were truly serious, a coach would frequently prefer the 
relatively sure bet offered by a junior or senior. Recruits would also be-
come more reluctant to accept early scholarship offers. Under the pre-
sent system, recruits (particularly the most highly desired ones who are 
most likely to receive early offers) feel free to accept early informal 
commitments because they can back out if a better deal comes along or 
their preferences change.128 The proposed system would actually make 
prized recruits more judicious about accepting early scholarship offers 
because they too will have to live with the consequences of their choic-
es. A recruit receiving an early scholarship offer from a mid-level pro-
gram would have to weigh its value against the possibility that a top-tier 
program will make an offer in the future. Although some of these re-
cruits may still prefer certainty to the possibility of something better, 
others will choose to wait and see what happens. Accordingly, allowing 
early binding commitments would probably reduce the prevalence of 
early recruiting at younger ages by making institutions and recruits less 
willing to make deals with each other. 
 Additionally, early binding commitments would ameliorate the un-
certainty that recruits face over the possibility of broken deals.129 Stu-
dent-athletes and coaches alike would be able to distinguish between 
those who are window-shopping and those who are serious. When two 
serious parties meet and agree, neither will have any reason to make 
contingency plans that could motivate the other side to break the deal. 
Although the NCAA might prefer that students not commit early at all, 
the practice will probably never disappear.130 Given this reality, those 
                                                                                                                      
127 See Staples, supra note 92 (advocating an early signing period for underclassmen 
who have made up their minds about which college to attend). 
128 See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
129 See Pascoe, supra note 93 (noting rescinded scholarship offer); Bodnar, supra note 
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who commit early at least ought to get certainty in return, and allowing 
early binding commitment will accomplish that. 
 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, acceptance of early binding 
commitments would allow the NCAA to structure their availability in a 
manner that can further discourage their use. For example, the NCAA 
could require institutions to guarantee scholarships for more than one 
year when offering them before the senior year. If an institution knew 
that early scholarship offers to underclassmen had to be guaranteed for 
more than the ordinary one year, it would make such early commit-
ments even less attractive by making mistakes even more costly. If, for 
example, an early scholarship offer to a freshman had to contain a 
guarantee of four years of aid, schools would offer them only to the fin-
est prospects, and casual commitments would probably disappear. 
Coaches would, of course, object to the notion that any athlete is worth 
a multi-year scholarship commitment. That, however, is exactly the 
point. The NCAA may not be able to eliminate early commitment, but 
it can make early commitments rare and fair. When an institution asks a 
student-athlete to make a binding commitment to a college before his 
senior year, the institution asks for a lot and puts the recruit under the 
very pressure that the NCAA wants to eliminate.131 It is only fair to give 
student-athletes who must deal with this pressure the security of know-
ing that their place in college is guaranteed for an amount of time 
commensurate with the early nature of their commitments. 
 The foregoing observations lead to this Article’s proposal. The 
NCAA should allow institutions to make formal, binding scholarship 
offers to recruits at any time. The specific terms of these offers would 
depend on the recruit’s grade in school. Seniors would, as they do now, 
get a one-year guaranteed scholarship. High school juniors would get 
two guaranteed years, sophomores three, and freshmen four. These 
scholarships would have to be honored and would count against the 
institution’s overall scholarship limit even if the athlete were to get cut 
from the relevant team or decide to stop playing the sport. Additionally, 
institutions would not be allowed to withdraw offers that will have been 
made until an NCAA-imposed deadline for acceptance has passed. For 
example, the NCAA could require institutions to keep all offers open 
until the following July 1. Once the July 1 date passed, unaccepted of-
fers would automatically expire. Institutions would, of course, be free to 
extend new offers for fewer guaranteed years if they so desired. 
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 This proposal will undoubtedly seem unconventional to many col-
lege sports veterans. It will probably work better than the DI Cabinet’s 
recently rejected proposal for curtailing early commitments, however, 
because it fundamentally changes the conditions under which institu-
tions and recruits operate, making early commitment less desirable for 
institutions and more fair to all concerned. 
 First, the proposal will effectively replace an often-used market for 
early informal commitments with a rarely-used market for early binding 
commitments. This will happen because the proposal forces institutions 
to live with their mistakes, and it raises the price of mistakes as institu-
tions pursue younger recruits. Very few institutions will want to make 
multi-year commitments to unproven youngsters, so institutions will 
rarely make early formal offers, restricting those offers to the most gift-
ed athletes. 
 Of course, some coaches will continue recruiting underclassmen 
and will make informal offers in hopes of getting a jump on the com-
petition. These informal offers will interest recruits much less than they 
presently do, however, because informal offers will no longer represent 
unequivocal enthusiasm for the recruit. Under existing rules, the best 
deal a recruit can get is a one-year, informal deal that could evaporate 
at any time.132 Recruits who wonder about a coach’s sincerity or enthu-
siasm cannot get meaningful reassurance because words are all that can 
be offered. An insincere coach can feign genuine enthusiasm by telling 
the recruit that the informal offer is the very best he or she can give 
under NCAA rules.133 
 The proposal renders this tactic much less effective because the 
availability of binding early commitments would allow coaches who are 
truly serious about a recruit to give an enforceable promise. A coach’s 
failure to offer a binding early commitment would tell a recruit that the 
coach’s enthusiasm for him or her is limited, and it is entirely possible 
that a rival institution will eventually offer the recruit a binding com-
mitment. Indeed, it is quite likely that lesser programs will use offers of 
early binding commitment to send unambiguous signals about a re-
cruit’s value in order to sign the recruit away from more prestigious 
programs that will not have made similar offers. Recruits therefore will 
have relatively few reasons to accept early non-binding offers and good 
reasons to wait for something better. To the extent that recruits accept 
                                                                                                                      
132 See Division I Manual, supra note 7, art. 15.3.3 (“If a student’s athletics ability is 
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early non-binding offers, the deals will be more unstable than ever be-
cause recruits will happily break non-binding deals to gain the security 
of binding offers from other institutions. This instability will mean that 
institutions and recruits alike will no longer expect informal deals to be 
honored as they do now. Those who want to window shop can make 
informal deals knowing full well that deals are “being tried on for size,” 
and those who are serious about getting deals made will use the formal 
binding commitments proposed here. 
 Second, and perhaps more importantly, the proposal will make 
early recruiting more fair for recruits. As noted above, recruits will get 
clearer signals about an institution’s genuine degree of interest. Addi-
tionally, recruits will not be subject to the “exploding offers” that some 
coaches have used to pressure recruits into premature decisions about 
early informal commitments because early binding offers will have to 
be kept open until July 1.134 Even better, recruits who accept binding 
offers will no longer have to worry about whether their deals will be 
secure. They will be able to rely on the promises they will have received 
without worrying that a coach might leave or change his mind. Finally, 
the increased number of guaranteed scholarship years will give recruits 
something in return for the fuss of making premature decisions about 
college. 
 There are, of course, problems with this proposal that must be ac-
knowledged. First, it is possible that institutions will try to preserve the 
status quo by refusing to offer anything but informal one-year com-
mitments.135 Institutions have good reason for trying to do this. Early 
informal one-year commitments carry less risk than formal multi-year 
ones because they allow institutions to avoid the primary danger of 
early recruiting (namely making a mistake about a recruit’s ability). 
Institutions may therefore offer only informal one-year deals in the 
hope that recruits will accept them in the absence of anything better. 
Such a strategy would probably fail, however, because it would rely on 
an unusual degree of cooperation between fierce competitors. Early 
recruiting has become a problem precisely because coaches are trying 
to sign recruits before their competitors can. If an institution decides 
not to make early binding commitments to prize recruits, it seems quite 
unlikely that its competitors will all follow suit. Someone will decide to 
                                                                                                                      
134 See Pennington, supra note 9 (describing the pressure coaches put on recruits by 
playing them off on one another). 
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“up the ante” by offering binding commitments to a few recruits.136 
Once this happens, the possibility of early binding commitments gives 
recruits options and information that render informal commitments 
considerably less attractive. 
 Second, the availability of early binding commitments raises the 
possibility that highly prized recruits will become subject to constant 
recruiting pressure that they do not face now. If early binding commit-
ments become legal, then institutions and recruits will have to commu-
nicate with each other directly more than NCAA rules presently allow.137 
It would be unfair to expect either side to make serious commitments 
without the benefit of face-to-face meetings and official campus visits. 
This could create chaos for highly-prized recruits, particularly if institu-
tions could communicate with underclassmen as freely as with seniors. 
There is, however, no particular reason why recruiting for underclass-
men should imitate recruiting for seniors. Formal recruiting of under-
classmen need not occur in the fall because the recruits in question will 
not be enrolling in college for at least another year. Communication, 
official visits, and signings could therefore be limited to specific times of 
year when interference with a recruit’s academics can be minimized 
(holiday periods and summers, for example) with full confidence that 
there is no need to rush. Limits like these might seem onerous to 
coaches who would prefer 24/7 recruiting, 365 days per year, but they 
would be workable. If institutions and recruits do not know enough 
about each other to comfortably make an early binding commitment, 
then they should simply wait. Early commitments should be used only in 
extraordinary cases. For the vast majority of athletes, early commitments 
should be discouraged, and if abbreviated recruiting periods for under-
classmen contribute to the necessary disincentives, so much the better. 
Conclusion 
 The NCAA has laudably begun the process of curbing informal 
scholarship deals with underclassmen. The recently rejected DI Cabinet 
proposal would probably have done little to change existing practices. 
Institutions that want to make early deals would still do so, and their 
chances of suffering adverse consequences would be low. Real reform 
                                                                                                                      
136 See id. (discussing coaches’ desire to be first in the recruiting game). 
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will be difficult to achieve unless institutions bear real costs for pursuing 
underclassmen and the value of early scholarship deals is diminished. 
 This Article has made a proposal to accomplish real reform by al-
lowing early binding commitments. Although this may seem counterin-
tuitive, this proposal will force institutions to live with any early recruit-
ing “mistakes” that are made, will raise the cost of early recruitment by 
increasing the length of the scholarship commitment associated with 
early deals, and will destabilize informal commitments so that parties 
will no longer realistically expect them to be honored. Together, these 
effects will discourage institutions from making early scholarship offers. 
And, to the extent that such offers are made, the proposal made here 
will give recruits who decide to commit early real security that they do 
not enjoy today. 
 Granted, no proposal is perfect. Nevertheless, the one made here 
hopefully will advance the dialog that takes place as the NCAA evalu-
ates a new framework to deal with the difficulties of early recruitment. 
